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from studies made in 1946 and 1958. The pro-
posals were each turned down for various rea-
sons. But the real reason for the repeated re-
jection of the early plans appears to be timing— 
the airlines had not yet felt the need to parti-
cipate in their insurance vehicle. They seemed to 
prefer to rely on their safety record and the 
established insurance markets. 
But now that the $25 million, 400-
passenger jumbo jets are about to roll up to pas-
senger terminals, the airlines are feeling the 
need. They do not know who will insure their 
larger and more expensive Boeing 747's, the 
McDonnell Douglas DC 10's and the Lockheed 
LI011 's—and they are uneasy. 
Airline officials are disturbed, not because 
they lack confidence in the airworthiness of 
(continued on page 34) 
PART I 
Picking up 
the Insurance Tab for 
the Jumbo Jets 
For 25 years the world's airline executives have 
been making periodic investigations into the 
feasibility of creating an airline-owned insurance 
company to provide the two major airline asso-
ciations—the Air Transport Association and the 
International Air Transport Association—with 
hull and casualty insurance. 
A 1943 study known as the Black Book 
Proposal was rejected, as were recommendations 
32 
PART II 
The Airlines Reach Out -
After Careful Study 
The decision of the two airline associations to 
reach o u t fo r tha t unprecedented insurance bill 
was not made wi thou t m u c h s tudy by airline 
officials. 
And tha t s t u d y - l i k e its r e s u l t s - w a s with-
out p recedent on the par t of the T o u c h e Ross 
management services team charged with analy-
zing the economic and business p rob lems likely 
to face the fledgling organizat ion. 
To account fo r costs when they could no t 
look to the past, the t eam b lended management 
j udgmen t in business decision making wi th ap-
proaches usually reserved for academic or highly 
technical appl icat ion. 
The first part of the consul tan ts ' project 
was the mos t convent ional . Here, they played 
devil 's advocate t o de te rmine w h e t h e r the con-
clusions of t he Red Book were feasible and de-
sirable. 
They concluded tha t the data in the airline 
report could be used t o est imate and review with 
a sample of airlines the benef i t s of the proposed 
insurance c o m p a n y , but tha t addit ional data 
would be necessary before a decision was within 
reach. 
The managemen t services team recommend-
ed that the financial a t t r ibu tes of an airline-
owned insurance vehicle be es t imated ; tha t the 
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PART I (continued) 
their new planes, but because they fear the in-
creased cost of the larger hull and the even 
higher costs expected to cover the additional 
passengers and third-party claims of persons and 
property injured by a fallen plane will exhaust 
normal aviation insurance capacity. 
This expected shortage comes on top of an 
already-increased insurance bill, pushed higher in 
1966 by the airlines' decision not to follow the 
Warsaw Convention limits and to allow liability 
up to $75,000 per passenger. Prior to removal of 
the limits, the ceiling for passenger liability had 
been $8,300. 
Members of ATA and I AT A have found 
little solace in the existing major insurance 
pools that cover about 80 percent of the indus-
try's risks. The pools have told the airlines they 
are capable of continuing coverage for the huge 
jets—but they have not named their price. 
And property and casualty insurance mar-
kets elsewhere are reeling under the impact of 
mounting claims on automobiles, property 
damaged in civil riots, the breakup of ocean tan-
kers and various other industrial and natural 
disasters. 
They too are reluctant to take on the 
jumbo jets and the accompanying insurance risks 
that will be greater than ever before.Although 
there cannot be any test cases, insurance experts 
have estimated that the crash of one jumbo jet 
could produce claims of $100 million. 
Opinion is mixed among economists and in-
surance experts as to whether it is advisable— 
or even possible-for the airlines to go into the 
insurance business. Some, such as London's 
ECONOMIST magazine, say the proposed, ven-
ture is "out of the question", the price tag will 
be too high for too many. 
Others say the airlines could pay the price 
since many are already carrying high deductible 
insurance. 
Regardless of "the dissenters, ATA/IATA 
announced from London on October 15 that it 
would move toward setting up an airline-owned 
corporation to provide any airline that wishes to 
join with the traditional forms of insurance. 
ATA/IATA plans to form the new company in 
mid-1969 after the required airlines and govern-
ments agree. 
The airline groups also announced at that 
time that Sir Giles Guthrie, chairman and chief 
executive officer of British Overseas Airways 
Corporation, will serve as chairman of the board 
of the proposed organization, which is expected 
to be headquartered in Switzerland. About a 
month later the airlines selected Clarence Pell, 
formerly with the Association of Aviation Un-
derwriters, to carry out their plans. 
This decision was the result of several 
studies—an initial survey during 1967 by a work-
ing group of ATA/IATA airline insurance spe-
cialists and a subsequent study by independent 
consultants in mid-1968. 
The ATA/IATA group concluded in its 
September 1967 report, called the Red Book, 
that the airlines should form a "non-profit, air-
line-controlled insurance company to provide 
coverage in three main areas—hull; legal liability 
in respect of passengers, cargo and mail; and 
other liability related directly to airline opera-
tions. 
"The need for such a self-protective step is 
indicated by aviation insurance history," the 
Red Book said. "Available insurance facts show 
that hull—and to an extent passenger liability-
insurance is overpriced during the introductory 
period for new equipment or new legislation 
relating to legal liability. 
"Scheduled 1969 introduction of the 
Boeing 747 dictates immediate action in a situa-
tion where the need for such voluntary self-
protection will continue through the SST (super-
sonic transport) introductory period well be-
yond 1975," the report continued. 
The outside consultants were charged first 
with evaluating the results of the Red Book 
study and later with outlining whether and how 
the new insurance vehicle would function. 
Three teams of consultants—in the legal, 
insurance and financial areas—were engaged to 
put together the jigsaw puzzle of an air in-
surance plan. 
The legal consultants came up with the 
answers to such questions as how and where to 
incorporate to best satisfy the complex require-
ments of a multi-national organization—and do 
it with the best tax benefits. 
Statisticians and operational research spe-
cialists were employed to develop a scientific 
and equitable formula for rating the airlines. 
These ratings were to become a tool for deter-
mining airline insurance premiums. 
And Touche Ross was asked to analyze the 
economic and business problems inherent in the 
proposed venture. • 
PART II (continued) 
results be reviewed with senior management of 
selected carriers; and the feasibility of an airline-
owned insurance vehicle be re-evaluated before 
more steps were taken. 
ATA/IATA accepted this first set of recom-
mendations and sent the team on its second 
phase. That called on the diverse techniques of 
operations research, market research, financial 
analysis and sound business judgment. 
Their task here was to: 
Identify carrier interest in participating in 
the proposed insurance vehicle; 
Determine the form of vehicle, type of cov-
erage, extent of coverage and capital require-
ments that will influence carrier participation; 
Estimate the amount of initial capital re-
quired to launch the vehicle and the supporting 
cash flow analysis. 
The team divided its forces to accomplish 
this phase, sending three men on a brisk-paced 
trip through 14 countries and keeping another 
task force at home in the firm's New York 
office. 
The traveling half of the team visited top 
management of 29 airlines to determine what 
characteristics of an airline insurance company 
would mo'st interest them. The men visited car-
riers representing about 70 percent of the world 
airline passenger-kilometer business, discussing 
the economic and structural attributes which 
would be crucial to their participation. 
In each country Touche Ross International 
provided a local partner or manager who sat in 
on the discussion so he could later give the 
American management services team the back-
ground on local problems and politics that 
would be necessary to the Americans' complete 
understanding of the talks. 
While the three men were traveling through 
most of the non-Communist world, the opera-
tions research experts in New York gathered 
data and set up a computer model to determine 
the capital requirements for a successful in-
surance vehicle. The data gathered by the tra-
veling team would later be fed into this model. 
They set up a program to determine the 
amount of financial resources required to absorb 
fluctuations in predictable losses and unpre-
cedented catastrophe. 
The operations research experts found the 
amount of capital needed to cover normal loss 
by using a computerized mathematical model, 
which balanced income from premiums against 
losses and expenses. They used the Monte Carlo 
s imulat ion technique, which uses random 
numbers rather than past history to generate 
data, for projecting hull and passenger liability 
losses through 1975. 
This technique is often applied to technical 
and middle management problems. But by ba-
lancing mathematical analysis and analytical 
business judgment, the team used operations 
research for top management decision making. 
Although there is no meaningful data to 
predict unprecedented catastrophes, the research 
did provide the airlines with a quantitative ana-
lysis that would be useful to the airline owners, 
who would ultimately decide the extent of their 
need of catastrophe coverage. 
The team gathered and interpreted the data 
in two months—a project operations research 
experts had estimated would take more than a 
year—by using the firm's time-share computers 
and leaving part of the team at home to work in 
parallel with their traveling colleagues. 
In the third phase of its project, Touche 
Ross estimated the insurance characteristics, 
operating costs and capital requirements that 
would be needed for several types of insurance 
vehicles; developed a framework for dividing 
capital requirements among the carriers; out-
lined the next steps the carriers should take to 
implement the plan. 
Their final report presented the monetary 
requirements essential to setting up either of 
two suggested vehicles. 
The report also reflected one of the aims of 
the project by suggesting a plan whereby the 
airlines would establish their insurance company 
in cooperation with the existing insurers—rather 
than in competition. 
This arrangement leaves the market to lead 
in such matters as setting individual rates and 
handling claims. 
After reviewing the reports of all the con-
sultants, ATA/IATA elected to move into the 
insurance business. 
As the associations begin to carry out their 
daring venture, they will take the Touche Ross 
management services team along for continued 
help with financial and management matters. • 
